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Donald Trump’s election, Scott Pruitt’s nomination and the withdrawal of the United States of 
America from the Paris Agreement created expectations of a weaker environmental regulation 
in the country. This thesis studies the stock market reactions to these events on the Russell 3000 
constituents. Investors rewarded carbon-intensive industries on the short run, as naïve intuition 
would suggest. However, and least expected, environmentally responsible firms also benefitted 
from these shocks. Such results are explained by the general increase in climate awareness, 
sparked by these events. Over the long run, the climate responsibility premium grew until the 
end of the year 2017, stagnating through the whole year of 2018. Changes in Donald Trump’s 
political influence consistently brought two different shocks to the climate responsibility 
premium. One from the perceived environmental deregulation, and the other from the rise in 
general climate awareness. The awareness shock prevailed until the end of 2017, benefitting 
climate responsible firms. The deregulation shock started overriding in 2018, as an increase in 
the President’s popularity began negatively affecting the premium. 
 
 















Prémio de Responsabilidade Climática:  Um 
Estudo de Evento do Choque na Política 









A eleição de Donald Trump, a nomeação de Scott Pruitt e a saída dos EUA do Acordo de Paris 
criaram expectativas de uma regulação ambiental mais ténue. Esta tese estuda as reações no 
mercado de ações durante estes eventos, nas empresas do índice Russell 3000. Os investidores 
recompensaram indústrias intensivas na emissão de CO2, como seria expectável. Contudo, e 
menos esperado, empresas responsáveis a nível ambiental foram também beneficiadas por estes 
choques. Tal resultado é explicado pelo aumento geral da consciência climática, espoletado por 
estes eventos. No longo prazo, o prémio de responsabilidade ambiental cresceu até ao final do 
ano 2017, estagnando durante todo o ano de 2018. Alterações na influência política de Donald 
Trump trouxeram consistentemente dois choques diferentes no prémio de responsabilidade 
climática. Um vindo da percecionada desregulação ambiental, e outro vindo do crescimento 
geral da consciência ambiental. O choque na consciência prevaleceu até o final do ano 2017, 
beneficiando empresas ambientalmente responsáveis. O choque da desregulação subrepôs-se 
durante o ano 2018, com os crescimentos de popularidade do Presidente a afetar negativamente 
o prémio de responsabilidade climática. 
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Over the past decades, there has been an increasing trend towards climate responsible actions, 
coming from a wide range of economic agents. Consumers have demonstrated growing 
concerns related to ethical consumer behaviour, including the consideration of ecological issues 
(Global CAD, 2019). Nations worldwide have signed the Paris Agreement in 2016, in a 
collective effort to reduce carbon emissions and fighting global warming. Firms have engaged 
more in corporate social responsibility, including environmental issues, especially those with 
higher levels of corporate governance (Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog, 2016). Investors have 
not only penalized more carbon-intensive firms (Matsumura, Prakash, and Vera-Muñoz, 2014), 
but also increased their concerns on climate issues in their investment decisions (Krueger, 
Sautner, and Starks 2019). 
Notwithstanding, it is still not clear to which extent investors value environmental 
responsibility, based on the information provided in the literature. In general, there is evidence 
of a climate responsibility premium, but its sources are yet to be explained and quantified. 
Investors may price climate performance according to real environmental concerns, such as the 
impacts of global warming on economies; may consider the effects of climate regulations; or 
may have personal preferences towards climate responsible firms. 
The general direction of environmental regulation has been one of slow, but steady progress. 
At least until November 8, 2016, when a major climate policy shock took place in the United 
States. Donald Trump’s election shifted all market’s expectations regarding climate policy, as 
the newly elected President had shown intentions to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement 
and scrap the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Clean Power Plan, during his 
campaign. The expectations towards environmental deregulation further increased on 
December 7, 2016, when Scott Pruitt, a climate change sceptic, was nominated to lead the EPA. 
On June 1, 2017, Trump’s promise to leave the Paris Agreement was delivered, becoming the 
first significant material shift in climate policy after the election. 
These incidents provide a unique setting to study how investors price climate performance. 
Specifically, these allow to test how shifts in environmental regulation affect the climate 
responsibility premium. The characteristics of these shocks are also ideal for performing the 
desired event study. One reason is that Donald Trump’s election was extremely unexpected, 
with the odds of winning reaching only 17% on Betfair on that same day. Another reason is that 
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all these events had an undeniable impact on climate policy, which potentially should have 
shifted investors’ attention to firms’ environmental performance, and subsequently adjusting 
their prices. 
Climate performance may be divided into two different segments: carbon intensity and 
environmental responsibility. Carbon intensity is reflective of a firm’s current environmental 
footprint (i.e., their levels of CO2 emissions in the present). Environmental responsibility is 
related to long-term oriented environmental actions and voluntary behaviour to reduce the 
carbon footprint in the future. Hence, this thesis aims to answer two research questions. Did 
carbon-intensive firms benefit from the climate policy shock? And were environmentally 
responsible firms penalized in the stock market from this same shock? 
To answer these questions, a study on the stock market reactions of the firms listed in the 
Russell 3000 is performed, for the following three events: Donald Trump’s election, Scott 
Pruitt’s nomination, and Donald Trump’s announcement to withdraw the US from the Paris 
Agreement. The measures of carbon intensity and environmental responsibility are constructed 
from Refinitiv’s ASSET4 database, which contains major information on Environmental, 
Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) performance. 
An expected result would be one that firms with higher levels of emissions benefitted from 
these shocks and, indeed, carbon-intensive industries were rewarded relative to others. What is 
a least expected is that environmentally responsible firms would gain from these events as well. 
However, the climate policy shock sparked the population’s attention towards climate change 
issues, increasing the overall environmental awareness. This effect is reflected through the 
positive reactions the market had on climate responsible firms. 
By extending the analysis to the long run, it is possible to see that the premium increased until 
the end of 2017, stagnating in 2018. When checking for Donald Trump’s daily popularity 
scores, one can see that in 2017, during the days that his popularity rose, the climate 
responsibility premium increased as well. In 2018, however, this relationship turned negative. 
These results suggest that Trump’s political influence consistently brought two shocks on the 
climate responsibility premium. One coming from the expected deregulation on climate policy, 
benefitting less responsible firms, and the other coming from the rise in environmental 
awareness, favouring more responsible ones. The awareness shock prevailed over the first until 
the end of 2017, and the deregulation shock started overriding the other in 2018, in times the 
premium stopped increasing. 
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This dissertation follows the approach used in Ramelli, Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler 
(2019) to study the impact that the climate policy shock had on environmentally responsible 
firms and carbon-intensive ones. This study adds further robustness to their results, given the 
climate performance indicators were extracted from a different ESG data provider. This is 
relevant, given the construction of these variables, especially for the environmental 
responsibility score, can be ambiguous, and a significant change in results could occur. The 
Paris Agreement withdrawal was added to the analysis, to understand how an actual material 
shift in climate policy was perceived in the market. Furthermore, the long-term analysis was 
expanded to the end of 2018, including an alternative empirical method. Lastly, several 
robustness tests that were not included in the original paper were performed in this dissertation, 
such as covering different sets of event and estimation windows, controlling for corporate social 
responsibility and testing with winsorized data. Overall, this dissertation goes beyond the 
original paper by performing a broader set of robustness tests on the main empirical strategy 
and by presenting new findings on the expanded long-term analysis. 
The remainder of the thesis is divided as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review, Section 
3 details the data and methodology, Section 4 displays the results on the empirical analysis, 
Section 5 reports the robustness tests, Section 6 concludes and Sections 7 and 8 present the 
references and appendices.
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2. Literature Review 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Recent years have been characterized by a rapid growth in research discerning the relationship 
between firms’ environmental and social (E&S) performance and capital markets. The literature 
on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), however, is not particularly new and can be dated 
back to Berle and Means (1932), when they laid a new light on the neoclassical economics 
perspective on corporations. 
The neoclassical theory indicates that the forces of supply and demand lead to an efficient 
allocation of resources, with some exceptions considered as market failures. It is then perceived 
that it is the role of the state to correct these market inefficiencies, such as externalities, and to 
redistribute the resources for community goals (Pigou, 1920).  
Extending this line of thought, Friedman (1970) states that the sole role of businesses is to 
maximize their profits, and that the social issues should be scrutinized and dealt with by the 
government only. Additionally, environmental and social commitments not only extract 
resources from the firm (Friedman, 1962) but also contribute to agency problems and moral 
hazard (Jensen, 1986; Baron, 2008), leading to a drop in financial performance and failing to 
meet with shareholders’ interests. 
Opposing this confined view of managers acting solely on the interests of shareholders, the 
stakeholder theory considers the concerns of a wider array of parties, such as employees, 
suppliers, customers and government, as relevant to the decision-making process of firms’ 
management. Berle and Means (1932) favour that firms have the moral obligation to pursue the 
improvement on problems relevant to society because of the special privileges provided to 
them. They also argue that social responsibility may bring increased social influence, which in 
turn brings increased economic power. 
The stakeholder value approach is defended by Freeman (1984), presenting both ethical and 
strategic arguments. On the ethical periphery, Freeman indicates that stakeholders may have a 
moral allegation on firms because these have the capability to harm or benefit them. Also, it is 
added that people are required to treat others as ends meet themselves; hence firms should 
respect stakeholders rather than just treating them as a corporate end (Evan and Freeman, 1990). 
Freeman finally states that business and ethics discourses cannot be separated such that a 
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business decision is made with no ethical content, or an ethical decision is made with no 
business content. On the strategic side, by engaging in a broader stakeholder value 
maximization approach, companies will be able to prosper from advantageous relationships 
with all the stakeholders in the future. This engagement will allow the firm to have long-term 
benefits, which in turn will also benefit shareholders in the future. They will also be able to 
comply more efficiently to outside demands. 
Porter et al. (2012) further improve this view, indicating that firms must play a leading role in 
bringing business and society back together. Michael Porter states that firms still have a narrow 
view of value creation, maximizing short-term economic gains while failing to address the ever-
important customer needs and the vast influences that accomplish long term success. The 
solution lies in the concept of shared value, which involves generating financial value while 
also creating value to the society by addressing its needs and challenges. This principle is not 
represented as social responsibility, philanthropy or sustainability, but as a means to achieve 
financial success. 
Henceforth, Freeman and Porter’s views indicate that CSR activities may be very well 
compatible with the neoclassical view of profit maximization, especially when the longer term 
is considered, as firms become more competitive by engaging in these activities (Amel-Zadeh, 
2018). 
Environmental & Social Responsibility and Financial Markets 
The aforementioned literature promoted the rise of research on the relationship between 
financial markets and E&S corporate performance, thereby providing answers to an already 
extensive set of questions.  Is the firm’s region of origin a relevant factor to its E&S score? 
Does CSR engagement provide negative or positive financial payoffs? Is there a premium on 
E&S responsibility in the capital markets, and if so, what are its origins? What is the role of 
institutional investors on companies’ E&S management decisions? Does climate change affect 
financial market prices? The section below will shed some light on what has been written by 
the academia on these propositions. 
E&S Performance and Companies’ Region of Origin 
In regards to the relationship between a firm’s region of origin perceived E&S relevance and 
the company’s CSR scores, there is a consensus in the literature that these two are strongly 
positively related. Liang and Renneboog (2017), working with CSR scores for more than 20,000 
firms, from 114 countries, find that a company’s legal country of origin and its CSR rating are 
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highly correlated. The legal origin provides a superior explanation to CSR scores than do other 
factors such as financial performance, regulatory quality, political institutions and corporate 
governance at the firm level. As seen through a regression analysis, firms from civil law 
countries have a 7% higher CSR score than firms from common law countries, which in turn 
have lower sustainability ratings. 
On a similar note, Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), looking into US firms, discover that 
companies score higher on CSR when they have Democratic founders, CEOs and directors, 
instead of Republican’s. CSR scores are also higher when the firms’ central offices are in 
Democratic-leaning states rather than Republican-leaning. Democratic-inclined firms allocate, 
on average, $20 million more on CSR than do Republican-inclined, or, from another 
perspective, around 10% of their net income.  
In the perspective of institutional investors, Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2019) show that 
foreign institutional investors do drive companies’ E&S performance, but only when these same 
investors are from countries where social norms reveal an above than average demand for E&S 
performance. 
CSR and Firm’s Financial Markets Performance 
A body of research has been devoted to studying whether the expenditure in stakeholder 
engagement impacts a firm’s profitability. The results from these studies, however, have been 
inconclusive: some present a positive relation, some a negative relation, and others a mix of 
both. 
On the work from Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), no evidence is found that the companies 
with higher expenditures on CSR recover from their investment through increased sales. 
Moreover, the rise of CSR ratings is linked to negative future stock returns and a downturn in 
firms’ Return on Assets, implying that the gains to stakeholders from social responsibility come 
with the sacrifice of shareholders’ value.  
Krueger (2015), performing a series of event studies to understand how markets respond to both 
negative and positive CSR news, shows that there are mixed reactions. Investors tend to respond 
strongly negatively to negative events, and weakly negatively to positive ones. The negative 
reaction from investors to positive CSR news is most likely related to their perception of 
increased agency problems. These, however, do react positively to positive CSR news when 
Climate Responsibility Premium:  An Event Study on the US Climate Policy Shock 
7 
 
they come from firms that had a history of poor stakeholder handling, being perceived as 
performing an “offsetting CSR”. 
By examining the impact of CSR on the cost of capital on US firms, El Ghoul et al. (2011) 
provide supportive arguments to the view that firms engaging in socially responsible practices 
have higher valuations and lower risk. Applying diverse approaches to estimate companies’ ex-
ante cost of equity, they find that firms with better CSR scores exhibit cheaper equity financing. 
Particularly, the findings indicate that investing in the development of responsible employee 
relations, environmental policy and product strategies enables a significant reduction on the 
cost of equity. Furthermore, the study shows that firms linked to “sin” business sectors, namely 
nuclear power and tobacco, observe higher equity financing costs. 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) further refine the view that there is a societal norm against 
financing “sin” stocks. They find that stocks operating in sectors that promote vice, such as the 
alcohol, tobacco and gaming sectors, are less bought by institutions that are more highly 
constrained by social norms. For example, mutual funds, which are natural arbitrageurs, are 
more likely to go long on sin industries than are pension funds. In general, sin stocks not only 
receive less coverage from analysts relative to other stocks but also have higher expected 
returns. 
Riedl and Smeets (2017) study why investors favour socially responsible mutual funds over 
others, by linking administrative data to survey replies and behaviour in incentivized 
experiments. Social preferences and social signalling are found to be an explanatory factor to 
socially responsible investing (SRI), and financial reasons are less relevant. Socially 
accountable investors also expect lower returns and pay higher fees on SRI funds as opposed 
to others. 
The literature has shown that shareholders drive E&S conduct on companies across the world. 
Dyck, Lins, Roth, and Wagner (2019) find that greater institutional ownership is linked to 
higher firm-level E&S scores, presenting support as well for a causal interpretation on that 
finding. 
Overall, despite not being clear whether firms that perform better on E&S aspects also perform 
better financially, it is generally agreed that these companies benefit from a premium in the 
market. That is, all else equal, the average investor is willing to pay more for an environmentally 
and socially responsible firm than others.  
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The Impact of Climate Change on Financial Markets 
A more recent body of literature is showing an increased concern from investors regarding the 
Climate Change risks. Krueger, Sautner, and Starks (2020) show, through a survey sent to 
institutional investors, that these already take climate risk as a major indicator to construct their 
portfolio, and that these risks have already begun to materialize, particularly the regulatory 
ones. Bernstein, Gustafson, and Lewis (2019), looking into real estate markets, find that homes 
exposed to sea-level rise sell roughly 7% less than other equivalent but unexposed properties, 
equidistant from the beach. However, these lower prices are mostly observed in regions that the 
population believes in the effects of climate change, as demonstrated by Baldauf, Garlappi, and 
Yannelis (2020). They find that houses predicted to be affected by sea-level rise in believer 
neighbourhoods sell at a discount relative to homes in sceptic neighbourhoods. Shedding light 
on this view of collective beliefs, Choi, Gao, and Jiang (2020) show that people raise their 
beliefs about climate change when facing unusually warm temperatures in their region. Stocks 
of firms operating in carbon-intensive industries underperform relative to others in abnormally 
warm weather, plus retail investors are more likely to sell these carbon-intensive stocks. 
Stock Price Reactions to Donald Trump’s Election in 2016 
Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018) analyzed how Donald Trump’s election in 2016 
shifted the stock market’s expectations on corporate taxes and trade policy. In line with the 
expectations of future tax reductions, high-tax firms benefitted relative to others in this event. 
Domestic focused companies fared better than international focused ones because of the 
expectations of more restrictive trade policies.  
To conclude, the literature does indicate that there is a premium on E&S responsible firms in 
the market. However, the sources of this premium are not yet well defined. According to what 
was detailed above, not only it isn’t clear whether environmentally and socially responsible 
firms perform better financially, but also, in some instances, social preferences override 
financial factors when it comes to investing. This dissertation sheds some lights on the sources 
of the climate responsibility premium by studying factors such as expectations of future 
environmental regulation and the general awareness of the public on climate-related issues. 
These factors encompass both financial and non-financial concerns. 
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3. Dataset and Methodology 
 
The data used to perform the event study consists of the Russel 3000 constituents in the year 
2016, when Donald Trump was elected. The index represents the largest 3000 US exchanged 
stocks, amounting to approximately 98% of all the nation’s public equity market. The selection 
had to be restricted to these firms only, because that is the extent to which Refinitiv’s ASSET4 
database provides information on Environmental, Social and Corporate Governance (ESG) 
metrics, for US corporations.  
The constituents list and their given stock prices were extracted from the Datastream database, 
as well as all the needed indicators for the calculation of firm-specific fundamentals, in the 
exception of the Cash Effective Tax rate, which was calculated using data from the Thomson 
Reuters database. 
Daily data for the riskless rate, market excess returns, size and value factor returns were 
extracted from Kenneth R. French’s website, to compute the CAPM and Fama and French 3 
Factor Model adjusted returns. 
For the use of a longer-term analysis in the stock price reactions to the events, data depicting 
Donald Trump’s popularity score during his presidency was extracted from Rasmussen 
Reports’ daily presidential tracking polls. 
Lastly, the indicators used to compute both measures of Carbon Intensity and Environmental 
Responsibility Scores were extracted from Refinitiv ASSET4 database. 
The Events Studied 
This study performs an analysis on the stock-price reactions to the following three events 
affecting climate policy in the United States: Donald Trump’s election for President of The 
United States on November 8, 2016; Scott Pruitt’s nomination to lead the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) on December 7, 2016; and Donald Trump’ announcement to 
withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement on June 1, 2017. 
These events provide unique advantages and disadvantages relative to each other to perform an 
analysis of investors’ reactions to the US Climate Policy shock. On an ideal setting, an event 
should be unexpected, and the event window shouldn’t include confounding effects. Otherwise, 
the reactions may be inexistent, or the results may be impacted by other shocks other than the 
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one intended to study (Kothari and Warner, 2007). The three cases examined, despite all 
representing a shift towards lower expected regulatory pressure on environmental 
responsibility, present different levels of surprise and shocks to the market. 
Donald Trump’s election is an excellent example of an unexpected event. On the morning of 
the election day, the odds on Betfair and FiveThirtyEight for Hillary Clinton’s victory were 
83% and 72%, respectively. Furthermore, the climate policy views from both candidates were 
poles apart. Hillary Clinton’s take on environmental concerns was similar to the then-President 
Barack Obama, having intentions to take further actions against global warming and making 
climate policy a priority1. Conversely, Donald Trump pledged to reverse this trend of greater 
environmental regulation. For instance, on his campaign website, it is possible to gather his 
intentions to “scrap the EPA’s so-called Clean Power Plan which the government estimates will 
cost $7.2 billion a year”. Moreover, Trump also had intentions to exit the Paris Agreement. 
These characteristics represent great strengths for Trump’s election as an event to study the 
stock price reactions on environmentally responsible firms. However, it comes with 
disadvantages as well. Trump’s election influenced expectations on many other areas besides 
climate policy. Controls on aspects such as tax and trade policy will need to be implemented to 
understand the true impact of his environmental views on firms’ stock prices. A more detailed 
discussion on this topic is presented on the Control Variables part of this section. 
Scott Pruitt’s nomination, on the other hand, represents a less surprising event, and one that 
wouldn’t deviate as much regarding the views from the other rumoured nominees. However, 
there was still an element of surprise to his nomination, given that there were other four 
potential candidates commented by the media (Cama, 2016). Furthermore, Pruitt’s position on 
climate policy was the most hostile out of all five candidates, showing scepticism on the science 
of climate change, and actively advocating to dismantle the Green Power Plan (Davenport and 
Lipton, 2016). The main strength of Pruitt’s nomination is that it is exclusively focused on 
environmental concerns. 
Lastly, Donald Trump’s announcement to leave the Paris Agreement is the least surprising 
event out of the three, given it was an intention presented throughout the candidate’s campaign. 
This event, however, has the advantage to represent an actual material shift on climate policy. 
 
1 On Hillary’s campaign website, one can find proposals to “cut energy waste in American homes, schools, 
hospitals and offices by a third and make American manufacturing the cleanest and most efficient in the world” 
(Hillary. 2016). 
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The Paris Agreement brought together, for the first time, 187 nations, representing 97% of the 
world’s greenhouse gas emissions, for a common cause to commit to efforts to fight climate 
change. Its central aim was to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and 
impacts of climate change”. By leaving this agreement, the United States’ government sent a 
clear message that it was moving towards environmental deregulation. 
The Environmental Performance Variables 
Two distinct hypotheses are tested in this thesis, one for each environmental performance 
variable. On one side, it is studied whether carbon-intensive firms benefited from the climate 
policy shock. On the other, it is tested if climate responsible firms also gained or lost from the 
same events studied. The empirical strategy is based on regressing abnormal returns against the 
environmental performance variables – Carbon Intensity and Environmental Responsibility – 
plus controls on firms’ characteristics. 
These two variables are fundamentally different from one another. The Carbon Intensity 
variable represents the firm’s current environmental footprint only, and the Environmental 
Responsibility represents the degree of structural changes that the firm is willing to take on to 
improve its environmental footprint in the medium to long-term. A Company with a high score 
in the second variable should encompass attitudes towards climate responsibility. Such actions 
include delineating goals to cut down future emissions and achieving energy efficiency; raising 
awareness to its employees regarding climate change risks and opportunities; creating 
specialized teams dedicated to environmental management; being transparent in the report of 
its emissions; and launching products that have designated effects to improve the environment. 
The First Hypothesis: Carbon Intensity 
The computation of the Carbon Intensity variable is made by extracting the value of the firm’s 
estimated total emission of CO2 and CO2 equivalents, in tonnes, from Refinitiv’ ASSET4 
database. In order to set this score in values relative to the firm’s size, the levels of emissions 
are divided by the firm’s Total Assets2.  
 
2 Other valid representations of company size are the EBITDA and Market Capitalization. The results using these 
variables as the normalization factors are identical. 
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The Second Hypothesis: Environmental Responsibility 
Two different Environmental Responsibility variables are used in this thesis. One is the original 
Environmental Pillar score provided by Refinitiv, and the other is a variable calculated by the 
author of the thesis using the metrics from the original score, but excluding the carbon intensity 
indicators. 
To understand why these two variables are used, it is essential to examine the structure of 
Refinitiv’s database and how the original score is computed. Refinitiv’s ASSET4 database 
provides a set of ESG scores, one being the Environmental pillar score. This score is calculated 
through a weighted average on 61 ESG metrics, which are all described in Table A1 in the 
appendix. Looking into these variables, one can see that, despite most being reflective of 
measures to improve future environmental sustainability, 15 of them are purely reflective of the 
firm’s current carbon footprint. The most evident case is the Total Estimated CO2 Equivalents 
Emission variable, which is used to compute the Carbon Intensity score previously described. 
Given this situation, the Refinitiv’s Environmental Pillar Score may pose the problem of 
encompassing both the effects of carbon intensity and climate responsibility on the stock price 
reactions, when only the latest was meant to be evaluated. In order to avoid this problem, 
another environmental score is computed, using a similar calculation method from Refinitiv 
(2019), but excluding all the 15 metrics that represent carbon intensity3. 
These scores are denominated as follows: 
E_Score_R: Original Environmental Pillar Score provided by Refinitiv; 
E_Score: Environmental Score calculated through Refinitiv’s Environmental performance 
metrics, excluding the carbon intensity ones. 
There is one strong argument favouring the inclusion of the carbon intensity indicators on the 
Environmental score, which relates to investors’ perception of climate responsibility. Investors 
 
3 The carbon intensity variables excluded on this calculation are indicated in Table A1 in the appendix. 
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may not fully see the distinction between a firm’s current environmental footprint and its 
commitment to improving environmental performance in the medium to long-term. It should 
be the case that they see Environmental Responsibility as a bundle of these two characteristics, 
as the major ESG rating agencies build their scores in that fashion, and investors, in turn, rely 
on these evaluations to build their E&S responsible portfolios (Escrig-Olmedo et al. 2019). 
Hence, it is relevant to perform the empirical analysis using both indicators. The E_Score will 
be the primary variable throughout the remainder of the thesis, and the E_Score_R will be tested 
on robustness tests. 
Computing the E_Score: 
The method to compute this score is similar to the one used by Refinitiv to calculate the 
Environmental Pillar Score. As mentioned, all the variables used in the original are also 
included in this rating, except for the ones that are representative of current environmental 
footprint. The individual rating for each metric is computed as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
𝑁𝑜.  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 +
𝑁𝑜. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
2
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑜.  𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠
 
 
After all individual metric scores are computed, the firm’s overall Environmental score is 
calculated through an equal-weighted average of all the metrics, presenting a final score 
between 0 and 1. 
Relationship Among the Climate Performance Variables 
Figure 1 presents the levels of correlation between the three environmental variables on the day 
of Donald Trump’s election4. The low levels of correlation showcase that there is a clear 




4 Coincidently, the latest available scores for ESG metrics are the same on the date of Scott Pruitt’s nomination. 
The scores on the date of the announcement of the withdrawal of the Paris agreement are similarly correlated. 














Figure 1. Scatter Plots and Correlations Between the Climate Performance Variables. 
The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016. The values for both variables are from 
the latest available date prior to November 8, 2016 
 
As expected, the E_Score_R has a lower correlation level than the E_Score, when correlating 
against Carbon Intensity. This is the case because the E_Score_R is also composed of metrics 
related to Carbon Intensity, and these subsequently affect the score negatively. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Environmental Performance Variables per Industry 
This table consists of descriptive statistics of the environmental performance variables computed through 
indicators provided by the Refinitiv’s ASSET4 database, on the Fama and French 12-industries classification. The 
construction of these variables is detailed on the thesis. The values for both variables are from the latest available 
date prior to November 8, 2016. The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016.  
Industry 
Carbon Intensity Environmental Score (E_Score) 
 
min mean max sd min mean max sd  
          
Consumer Non-Durables 0.18 6.37 47.63 8.77 12.20 49.65 93.30 23.47  
Consumer Durables 0.31 6.48 60.13 8.71 6.78 41.46 86.54 22.02  
Manufacturing 0.24 18.74 289.15 41.89 6.41 43.24 96.40 23.62  
Energy 0.99 25.82 269.85 35.79 13.79 45.75 94.97 20.55  
Chemicals 0.12 56.06 1084.82 148.79 9.72 45.31 91.87 23.47  
Business Equipment 0.00 3.40 102.11 8.17 7.18 47.01 98.84 23.83  
Telecomunication 0.08 1.93 14.12 2.41 12.63 39.53 90.37 23.26  
Utilities 0.14 53.34 258.81 62.24 8.40 50.14 97.16 21.47  
Shops 0.05 14.19 620.52 47.93 11.75 45.11 98.74 21.87  
Healthcare 0.06 1.58 12.11 1.77 14.05 46.18 98.66 16.32  
Money 0.00 0.60 17.46 1.49 16.18 39.50 97.01 19.20  
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Interestingly, Carbon Intensity is still positively correlated with both climate responsibility 
variables, and statistically significant for a 1% significance level. This may be explained by the 
fact that these types of firms have stricter regulatory requirements to fulfil, but also due to 
higher public exposure to environmental matters, leading to increased social pressure to better 
perform in that regard (Tang and Demeritt, 2017). 
Control Variables 
Donald Trump’s election did not just present a direct shock to climate policy. From expectations 
of tax reform to a potential trade war, different exogenous impacts from the election arise and 
must be taken into consideration in this study. 
Tax Reform 
Prospects of major tax reductions rose when Donald Trump won the election, especially 
because the Republican party would then control both houses of congress. Trump’s take on tax 
policy was, among other things, to reduce the corporate tax from 35 to 15 per cent, applicable 
to all firms (Trump, 2016a). This radically opposes Hillary Clinton’s plan, which focused on 
increasing taxes on selected income groups (Cole, 2016). Indeed, high tax-paying firms 
substantially benefitted from the results of the election, compared to low-paying taxes (Wagner, 
Zeckhauser, and Ziegler, 2018). To control for this effect, I use the same variable as in the just 
mentioned paper, the Cash Effective Tax Rate, which is the ratio of cash taxes paid to pretax 
income. To be more precise, it is used the five-year average of that same ratio. 
Trade Policy 
Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018) show as well that the stock price reactions for firms 
with high foreign exposure were negative. The result is mainly explained by the prospects of a 
trade war and retaliatory tariffs. I control this effect through a variable provided by Datastream, 
with the percentage of foreign revenues relative to total sales in the year before the event. To 
simplify, I’ll call it Foreign Exposure for the remainder of the thesis. 
Firm’s Fundamentals 
Lastly, standard financial accounting data controls are used to control for the companies’ 
financial health. Return on assets (ROA) is used as a measure of firm’s profitability; debt to 
total assets as a control for leverage; the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value as an 
indicator of size; and the net sales percentage growth, relative to the previous year, as a measure 
of revenue growth. 
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the independent variables, used for the Donald 
Trump’s election. The latest available data prior to the date of each event is used. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Firm Characteristics 
This table consists of descriptive statistics of firm characteristics, computed through indicators provided by 
Datastream. The construction of these variables is detailed on the thesis. The values for all variables are from the 
latest available date prior to November 8, 2016. The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 
8, 2016, that had available information on the indicators. 
 
Abnormal Returns 
In order to compute the abnormal returns, daily stock returns were extracted from Datastream 
from October 1, 2015, to January 1, 2019, for all the studied firms. The daily data for the returns 
on the risk-free asset, market excess returns and the size and value factors were extracted from 
Kenneth French’s website, for that same time period. 
Three sets of returns are considered in this study: Raw returns; Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) adjusted returns; and Fama and French three-factor model adjusted returns. 
To perform the calculation of the abnormal returns, one needs to define the event and estimation 
windows. The period over which the stock price reactions of the firms involved are examined 
is defined as the event window. Event windows of 1, 3, 5 and 10 days were considered, all 
starting on the day of the event. For a long run analysis, the abnormal returns are also calculated 
on all days until the beginning of 2019. 
The estimation window is used to compute parameters for the CAPM and FF 3 Factor model 
adjusted returns, which will enable to estimate a normal price in case the event did not occur. 
  N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
E_Score 2102 0.44 0.21 0.06 0.27 0.37 0.58 0.99 
Carbon Intensity 2206 0.10 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 10.85 
Cash ETR 2132 0.21 0.19 0.00 0.05 0.21 0.31 0.98 
Foreign Exposure 2215 21.80 27.99 0.00 0.00 5.82 40.14 100.00 
ROA 2545 -2.58 34.45 -201.43 0.02 2.38 6.05 210.40 
Leverage 2545 27.40 26.40 0.00 6.58 23.50 41.01 316.59 
Log Market Cap 2550 7.41 1.75 1.40 6.13 7.31 8.53 13.29 
Revenue Growth 2471 25.69 583.15 -100.00 -2.93 4.47 14.51 28311.48 
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That window has a length of 1 year, from the end of the third quarter of 2015 until the beginning 






Figure 2. Estimation and Event Windows 
 
In the literature performing event studies, it is also common to include on the event window the 
days prior to its occurrence. This decision seems reasonable in scenarios when a section of the 
market may have had information regarding the event before it became widely known 
(MacKinlay (1997)). On this thesis, for the Scott Pruitt nomination and the Paris Agreement 
withdrawal, there is a chance that part of the market could have received the information before 
it went public. Thus, in the robustness section, I include event windows with the days prior to 
the incidents as well. 
Furthermore, it is also common in the literature to use an estimation window that is close to the 
actual event (MacKinlay (1997)). The reason for using a common window for the three events, 
prior to any of them taking place, is that it avoids the parameters to be altered by the shocks 
from these same events. Nevertheless, on the robustness section, the results are also tested using 
different estimation windows, closer to the Scott Pruitt nomination and Paris Agreement 
withdrawal announcement dates. 
With the windows defined, it is then possible to calculate CAPM adjusted returns. The measure 
of systematic risk (beta) is computed running an OLS regression of daily stock returns in excess 
of the risk-free asset versus the market excess returns, on the estimation window, for each stock. 
Then, for firm i and date t, the abnormal returns are calculated as follows: 
 
5 For the stocks that didn’t have available data for the entire event window, only those with at least 120 daily 
returns observations were considered for the study. This decision is made to avoid defective parameters 
estimations. A window of 120 daily observations, however, is already considered as one of good length 
(MacKinlay (1997)). 
 
October 1, 2015 September 30, 2016 
Estimation Window 
Event Studied 
Event Windows: 1, 3, 5 and 10 days 
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𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖 × (𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓𝑡)) 
Where ARi,t, Ri,t, rft, Bi and Mktt are the abnormal returns, raw returns, rate of the riskless asset, 
market beta and market returns, respectively. 
The FF adjusted returns are computed similarly. To calculate the factor exposures, the excess 
returns of the stocks are regressed against the market excess returns, size and value factors. The 
abnormal returns are then computed as follows, for firm i and date t: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖 × (𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑡 −  𝑟𝑓𝑡) +  𝛽2𝑖 × (𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡) +  𝛽3𝑖 × (𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡)) 
Where β1i, β2i and β3i are the coefficients for the market excess returns (Mktt – rft), size factor 
(SMBt) and value factor (HMLt). 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics on the abnormal returns for all the three events. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on Stock Returns 
This table consists of descriptive statistics of the stock returns. Panel A represents the stock returns starting on the 
day after Donald Trump’s election, in November 9, 2016. Panel B represents the stock returns starting on the day 
of Scott Pruitt’s nomination, on December 7, 2016. Panel C represents the stock returns starting on the day of the 
Paris agreement withdrawal, on June 1, 2017. Raw returns, CAPM adjusted returns and FF three factor model 
returns are considered. The computation of these returns is detailed on the thesis. The sample includes the Russell 
3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available information on all the indicators. 
 
Panel A: 
Trump's Election (November 9, 2016)      
Raw Returns N sd min mean max 
On the day 2550 4.71 -31.26 2.83 43.13 
Cumulative 3 days 2550 8.47 -31.67 6.24 102.55 
Cumulative 5 days 2550 9.41 -37.45 7.72 109.35 
Cumulative 10 days 2550 10.40 -28.30 9.92 109.66 
Cumulative until December 29, 2017 2550 39.86 -166.31 31.47 284.62 
Cumulative until December 31, 2018 2550 53.60 -245.64 23.00 435.27 
CAPM adjusted returns           
On the day 2550 4.50 -33.99 1.16 42.00 
Cumulative 3 days 2550 8.21 -35.34 3.99 97.55 
Cumulative 5 days 2550 8.98 -41.24 4.31 101.78 
Cumulative 10 days 2550 9.98 -35.71 4.95 104.97 
Cumulative until December 29, 2017 2550 40.26 -201.40 0.55 257.19 
Cumulative until December 31, 2018 2550 54.51 -288.30 -1.70 415.66 
FF adjusted returns           
On the day 2550 4.45 -37.18 -0.19 42.04 
Cumulative 3 days 2550 8.44 -53.88 -0.30 87.76 
Cumulative 5 days 2550 9.24 -54.14 -0.12 95.17 
Cumulative 10 days 2550 10.41 -63.21 -0.33 91.17 
Cumulative until December 29, 2017 2550 40.03 -199.70 2.03 258.61 
Cumulative until December 31, 2018 2550 53.60 -286.57 3.37 434.31 







Paris Agreement withdrawal (June 1, 2017)     
Raw Returns N sd min mean max 
On the day 2550 2.12 -19.20 1.72 26.59 
Cumulative 3 days 2550 3.30 -21.31 1.72 30.62 
Cumulative 5 days 2550 4.31 -22.23 1.42 43.72 
Cumulative 10 days 2550 5.93 -30.99 3.02 41.26 
CAPM adjusted returns           
On the day 2550 2.05 -20.45 0.51 24.43 
Cumulative 3 days 2550 3.26 -23.87 0.27 30.23 
Cumulative 5 days 2550 4.29 -23.96 0.13 41.96 
Cumulative 10 days 2550 5.86 -32.22 1.30 37.56 
FF adjusted returns           
On the day 2550 2.12 -20.90 0.01 24.75 
Cumulative 3 days 2550 3.24 -24.42 -0.13 29.69 
Cumulative 5 days 2550 4.20 -25.34 -0.20 40.94 




Pruitt's nomination (December 7, 2016)     
Raw Returns N sd min mean max 
On the day 2550 2.48 -15.33 0.88 36.81 
Cumulative 3 days 2550 4.53 -27.87 2.52 50.06 
Cumulative 5 days 2550 5.12 -35.99 1.64 46.64 
Cumulative 10 days 2550 6.67 -41.87 2.16 49.55 
CAPM adjusted returns           
On the day 2550 2.62 -17.91 -0.57 34.77 
Cumulative 3 days 2550 4.69 -32.07 0.13 48.71 
Cumulative 5 days 2550 5.39 -38.39 -1.09 42.66 
Cumulative 10 days 2550 6.89 -44.05 -0.67 45.43 
FF adjusted returns           
On the day 2550 2.42 -15.85 -0.02 35.68 
Cumulative 3 days 2550 4.66 -30.71 0.01 48.85 
Cumulative 5 days 2550 5.12 -36.77 -0.03 44.28 
Cumulative 10 days 2550 6.78 -41.95 -0.25 45.97 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
Industry-Wide Market Reactions 
The first analysis consists of an industry-wide examination of the stock price reactions to 
Donald Trump’s election. In the sample composed of the Russell 3000 constituents in 2016, the 
industries of precious metals, steelworks, utilities, chemicals, transportation, coal, petroleum 
and natural gas are on top in terms of carbon intensity, when looking to the full 30 Industry 
classification by Fama and French. These industries also represent about 74% of the full sample 
CO2 equivalents emissions. 
A similar pattern can be found when looking into the figures provided by the Environmental 
Protection Agency on the Green House Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP), that includes 
information on the top-emitting sectors of greenhouse gas in the US. These sectors include 
power plants, refineries, chemicals, waste, metals, pulps and paper, petroleum and others, such 
as mining. Altogether, these represent 85-95% of all the US greenhouse emissions, if the 
information reported by the suppliers is included. 
Looking into figure 3, one can see that the carbon-intensive industries benefited from Donald 
Trump’s election in terms of stock market reactions. The graph shows the coefficients for the 
30 industry dummies when regressing the CAPM adjusted returns against these dummies, Cash 
ETR, Foreign Exposure and firms’ fundamentals variables. The event window is one composed 
of the actual day, on November 9, 2016, and another that prolongs from that same day until the 
end of 2016. The results are sorted from highest to lowest for the one-day event window. 
Investors reacted instantly positively to “dirty” industries, such as coal, steelworks, metals and 
petroleum and natural gas on the election’s day. The effects towards the end of the year provide 
a similar picture for carbon-intensive industries, with a specific rise on the petroleum and 
natural gas, steelworks and transportation industries. However, it also depicts a potential 
overreaction from the market on the coal and precious markets on the day of the election. 
The utilities’ sector was the only carbon-intensive industry that did not face a positive stock 
price reaction. This may be partly explained by the investors’ expectations of market growth, 
and their subsequent shifts from low risk to high beta industries (Wagner, Zeckhauser, and 
Ziegler, 2018). 
 



















Figure 3. Abnormal Returns Subsequent to Donald Trump’s Election, by Industry 
This figure includes the industry coefficients for the regression of CAPM adjusted returns against these same 
dummies, the Cash ETR, Foreign Exposure and firms’ fundamentals variables, on the day after the election and 
through the end of the year of 2016. The 30-industry classification is taken from Fama and French’s website, and 
the sector left out to serve as basis was “Everything Else”. The sample includes the 2471 firms of the Russell 3000 
constituents from November 8, 2016 that had available information on all the variables. The values are sorted from 
highest to lowest on the coefficients for the election’s day returns. 
 
There are, of course, other exogenous shocks that Trump’s election brought to the market that 
would create industry-wide stock price reactions. For example, the prospects of a trade war 
shifted the expectations to increased costs on industries that were highly depended on imports, 
such as apparel, which had the lowest cumulative returns. Trump’s proposition to repeal and 
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replace the Obamacare with Health Savings Accounts (Trump, 2016b) brought uncertainty to 
the market and, despite the initial positive reaction, the healthcare sector lost significantly 
through the end of the year as well. On the reverse, the financial industry benefitted from the 
election’s outcomes, as the regulation on this industry was expected to appease. 
This diverse set of policy shocks, other than the climate policy shock, could have potentially 
affected the market reactions on the carbon-intensive industries as well. Trump’s assertion to 
restore the manufacturing sector is an example of how these could have benefitted from positive 
responses. However, it is still remarkable how the carbon-intensive industries benefitted in 
relative terms to other industries. 
Figure 3 does not describe, however, the effects within the industries. As previously mentioned, 
there was significant variability within the industries in terms of environmental performance, 
and the same is true for the variability in abnormal returns. The following sub-section will 
exploit these movements within the industries to investigate how environmental responsibility 
affected the stock price reactions on the three events. 
Within-Industry Market Reactions 
This section runs the primary empirical strategy explained in the methodology, regressing the 
cumulative abnormal returns against the climate performance variables, plus controls and 
industry fixed effects. Table 4 presents the regression results using the CAPM adjusted returns 
as the dependent variable, and the E_Score as the environmental responsibility variable. For 
space reasons, the 3 days cumulative abnormal returns are not included in the table. 
The effect of environmental responsibility on abnormal returns was not immediate, given it was 
not statistically significant on the day after Trump’s election. However, and most strikingly, on 
the 5 and 10 days event windows, one can see that the market reacted strongly positively 
towards environmentally responsible firms. To be precise, firms displaying a one percentage 
point higher in the environmental score had, on average, a 0.082 percentage points higher 
CAPM adjusted returns over the 10 days after the election, ceteris paribus. Economically, this 
represents a sizeable effect. Given the standard deviation of the environmental score is 0.21 in 
the sample, a one standard deviation increase in the E_Score represents a 1.47 percentage points 
(0.21*8.17) increase in the 10 days cumulative CAPM adjusted returns, which is 14.7% of the 
standard deviation of those same returns. 
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The results are strongly positive, and statistically significant, on all of Scott Pruitt’s event 
windows. The immediate impact of a one percentage point increase of the E_Score was a 0.028 
percentage points in the abnormal returns, and 0.054 percentage points increase in the 10 days 
cumulative abnormal returns. 
The Paris Agreement withdrawal event does not present statistically significant results for the 
environmental score variable, showing mixed signs throughout the event windows as well. 
The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with the results from Wagner, 
Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2018). High-tax firms outperformed relative to low-tax firms, and 
internationally oriented firms underperformed relative to domestically focused ones. 
Furthermore, and still consistent with their results, increased leverage presents statistically 
significant negative effects on firms’ performance after the election. The profitability measure 
(ROA), shows negative effects on Trump’s election, but positive ones on Scott Pruitt’s 
nomination, while no statistically significant signs on the Paris Agreement Withdrawal. 
Table 4. Environmental Responsibility and Stock Returns 
This table presents the OLS regression results running the CAPM adjusted returns on the environmental score 
(E_Score), and the set of control variables (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market capitalization, leverage, ROA 
and revenue growth). The computations of these variables are described in the thesis. The sample includes the 
Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available information on the indicators. All regressions 
include FF 12 industry fixed effects. Columns 1 to 3 include Donald Trump’s election day and subsequent 5 and 
10-days cumulative returns, respectively. Columns 4 to 6 include Scott Pruitt’s nomination day and subsequent 5 
and 10-days cumulative returns, respectively. Columns 7 to 9 include the Paris agreement withdrawal 
announcement day and subsequent 5 and 10-days cumulative returns, respectively. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Variable:
Event Window: Nov 9 5 days 10 days Dec 7 5 days 10 days Jun 1 5 days 10 days
E_Score 1.12 6.64** 8.17*** 2.74*** 5.25*** 5.4*** -0.01 -1.64 2.83
Cash ETR 0.10 2.15** 2.26** -0.12 0.21 0.50 0.11 -0.76 0.75
Foreign Revenues -0.01** -0.02*** -0.02** 0.00** 0.01* 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.03***
Log Market Cap -0.47*** -1.89*** -2.65*** -0.01 -0.28*** -0.65*** -0.14*** -0.13* -0.56***
Leverage -1.99*** -3.76*** -3.76*** 0.31 -1.03** -1.23** -0.11 0.01 -0.50
ROA -2.83*** -9.52*** -3.31* 3.23*** 7.08*** 8.29*** 0.08 0.31 0.86
Revenue Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00***
Observations 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765 1765 1827 1827 1827
R-Squared 14.00 26.25 27.84 17.60 9.97 10.65 4.45 7.05 14.35
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FF 12 Industries FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5 presents the results for similar OLS regressions, now including the carbon intensity 
variable in the list of independent variables. The coefficients for the environmental scores are 
in line with the results of the first regression, except for one statistically significant positive 
outcome for the 10 days event window on the Paris Agreement Withdrawal.  
As to the carbon intensity indicator, there was an immediate positive impact for high 
greenhouse gas emitters. For a 10 percentage points increase in carbon intensity, the abnormal 
returns increased, on average, 0.06 percentage points, all else equal. However, these effects 
stopped being statistically significant once the event windows were expanded, showing that the 
investors reexamined their positions on high emitting firms. Furthermore, the carbon intensity 
factor did not have substantial effects on both Scott Pruitt and Paris Agreement events. This 
indicates that these events did not have a significant impact on investors’ expectations towards 
shifts in carbon pricing, or regulatory requirements when looking on the effects within 
industries. These results are robust when running a regression not including the environmental 
performance score (Table A2 in appendix). 
Table 5. Environmental Responsibility, Carbon Intensity and Stock Returns 
This table presents the OLS regression results running the CAPM adjusted returns on the environmental score 
(E_Score), the carbon intensity measure, and the set of control variables (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market 
capitalization, leverage, ROA and revenue growth). The computations of these variables are described in the thesis. 
The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available information on the 
indicators. All regressions include FF 12 industry fixed effects. Columns 1 to 3 include Donald Trump’s election 
day and subsequent 5 and 10-days cumulative returns, respectively. Columns 4 to 6 include Scott Pruitt’s 
nomination day and subsequent 5 and 10-days cumulative returns, respectively. Columns 7 to 9 include the Paris 
agreement withdrawal announcement day and subsequent 5 and 10-days cumulative returns, respectively. ∗∗∗ 
p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable:
Event Window: Nov 9 5 days 10 days Dec 7 5 days 10 days Jun 1 5 days 10 days
E_Score 1.57 7.43*** 9.01*** 2.74*** 5.17*** 5.34** -0.05 -1.81 3.36*
Carbon Intensity 0.56** 0.23 0.06 0.17 -0.06 0.14 -0.10 0.32 0.10
Cash ETR 0.01 2.10** 2.16* -0.12 0.11 0.42 0.05 -0.82* 0.38
Foreign Revenues -0.01*** -0.02*** -0.02** 0.00* 0.01** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.03***
Log Market Cap -0.50*** -1.91*** -2.67*** -0.01 -0.28*** -0.65*** -0.13*** -0.10 -0.59***
Leverage -1.90*** -3.62*** -3.65*** 0.30 -1.04** -1.25** -0.01 0.06 -0.47
ROA -3.24*** -10.04*** -3.86** 3.17*** 7.15*** 8.39*** -0.63 0.78 0.14
Revenue Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.00
Observations 1743 1743 1743 1743 1743 1743 1728 1728 1728
R-Squared 15.25 26.75 28.18 17.56 9.94 10.59 4.57 6.86 15.92
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FF 12 Industries FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Overall, the results oppose to the common hunch that less climate responsible firms were going 
to be positively affected by these shocks in environmental regulation. Right after Trump’s 
election, the media was clear at indicating that the rollback on many climate policies was likely 
going to occur (for example, Bloomberg, 2016). Furthermore, even if investors perceived this 
shock as a temporary change, with the natural trend of tighter regulation continuing in the 
future, the negative shock to these firms would not still be explained. 
So, why did the environmentally responsible firms benefit relative to others? A potential 
explanation may be that Trump’s election brought higher levels of awareness to the general 
public in terms of climate change, creating increased pressure both on firms to move towards 
future lower emissions and investors to bet on more environmentally responsible firms. Indeed, 
Yale University and Gallup demonstrated, through opinion polls in 2017, that a record 
percentage of Americans was concerned about global warming, with 47% ‘worrying a great 
deal’, as opposed to 39% in 2016. 
This type of reverse ripple effect isn’t new to election outcomes. Tesler (2012) shows, for 
example, that Obama’s legislative proposals on the Healthcare sector polarized opinions by 
racial issues and race. This racial divide was 20 percentage points greater in 2009-2010 than it 
was in 1993-1994, over President Bill Clinton’s plan that had similar proposals. 
The same type of effects could have been heightened from other major political events on 
climate regulation, such as the nomination of Scott Pruitt to lead the EPA and US’ 
announcement to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The results do indicate that this was the 
case for Pruitt’s nomination, but not for the Paris Agreement withdrawal. 
The next section will, among other things, shed some light as to why investors may not have 
reacted to the Paris Agreement, looking into the long-term stock returns. Furthermore, it will 
also enable a further scrutinization as to why investors reacted positively to Trump’s election 
and Scott Pruitt’s nomination, through increased climate awareness. 
Long-Term Analysis and Trump’s Popularity 
This section provides an expansion of the previous analysis to the long run. On figures 4 and 5, 
CAPM adjusted returns are regressed against the environmental score (plus the usual set of 
controls), for all days between November 9, 2016, and Dec 31, 2018. The values used for the 
controls and the environmental performance variable are the latest available relative to each 
day. The estimation windows follow a daily rolling window, starting in the original interval 
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presented in figure 2, and progressing until reaching the last quarter of 2018. Figure 4 plots the 










Figure 4. Distribution of R-Squares Over the Long Run 
This figure shows the distribution of the R-squares from the OLS regressions running the daily CAPM adjusted 
returns on the environmental score, plus the usual set of control variables (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market 
capitalization, leverage, ROA and revenue growth) from the day of Donald Trump’s election until end of 
December 2018. The values of all variables are updated to the most recently available prior to each day. All models 
include FF 12 industry fixed effects. The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that 
had available information on the indicators each day, averaging 1836 firms. The estimation windows follow a 
daily rolling window, starting in the period of October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016 and progressing until reaching 
the last quarter of 2018. 
 
Most R-squares have a relatively low value, with the sample median being 8.14%. This is not 
surprising. Given the independent variables are regressed against returns that are already 
adjusted to the CAPM, one should not expect that these will have great explanatory power for 
the exceptional shifts on this model every single day. Indeed, these regressions should have 
higher explanatory power at times a major unexpected event occurs, related to climate policy6 
– such as Trump’s election and Scott Pruitt’s nomination – which is the reason these were built 
in the same place. Notwithstanding, the long-term analysis is useful to provide an understanding 
as to how the climate responsibility premium evolved overtime after the policy shock. 
Looking back to Table 4, one can see that the Paris Agreement withdrawal’s R-squared is only 
4.45% for the one-day event window. Compared to the other days where no climate policy-
 
6 The highest R-squares in the sample occur at times when several updates of firms’ fundamentals are made, 
mostly in the form of announcement of returns. 
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related event took place, this is a very low value, being close to the 8th percentile of the sample7. 
The low R-squared suggests that the announcement to leave the Paris Agreement was not 
impactful enough to provide major unexpected shifts in the stock market. This may have 
happened because the event was no major surprise to investors overall. As explained in the 
methodology section, an event study should only be fruitful in case the event was unexpected; 
otherwise, the market could have already priced it. The results in this thesis suggest that 
Trump’s election and Scott Pruitt’s nomination provided strong enough signals to investors that 
the US was, sooner or later, going to leave the Paris Agreement. After all, cancelling the Paris 
climate deal was one of the main flags in energy policy on the presidential campaign. 
Figure 5 plots the cumulative sum of the coefficients from the environmental score on these 
same regressions. Notably, there was a sharp rise in the climate responsibility premium through 
the end of the year of 2016, reaching 17.79 percentage points by its close. This premium was 
adjusted at the beginning of 2017 but then kept a steady growth until mid-January of 2018, 
achieving 32.06 percentage points. From that date forward, the market stopped increasing the 
reward to environmentally responsible firms. 
It is also notable that, throughout the whole period, the pricing of corporate climate 
responsibility presented high levels of volatility, reaching a daily standard deviation of 1.19%. 
This variability provides a chance to perform an analysis of how Trump’s popularity affected 
the premium on environmentally friendly companies. 
In order to do so, the levels of Trump’s daily approval were extracted from Rasmussen Reports’ 
polls, and these values were standardized to have a zero average and a one-unit standard 
deviation. These polls are available from January 20, 2017, when Donald Trump officially 
commenced his presidency term. These scores may reflect the President’s capability to defend 
his legislations towards reduced climate standards, the odds of fulfilling the full first term and 
the chances of being reelected. 
Table 6 presents the panel regression results using the daily CAPM adjusted returns as the 
dependent variable and the environmental score, its relation to the Trump’s approval scores and 
the usual set of controls as the independent variables. The full period starts at the President’s 
 
7 The R-squared on the day immediately after the Announcement of the Paris agreement withdrawal was 9%. 
This value, however, is still very close to the median, being at the 54th percentile. 
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inauguration day and extends until the end of the year 2018, and then two panel regressions are 











Figure 5. Climate Responsibility Premium Over the Long Run 
This figure plots the cumulative sum of the coefficients on the environmental responsibility score (E_Score) from 
the day of Donald Trump’s election until the end of December 2018. Each observation represents an OLS 
regression running the daily CAPM adjusted returns on the environmental score, plus the usual set of control 
variables (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market capitalization, leverage, ROA and revenue growth). The values 
of these variables are updated to the most recently available prior to each day. All models include FF 12 industry 
fixed effects. The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available 
information on the indicators each day, averaging 1836 firms. The estimation windows follow a daily rolling 
window, starting in the period of October 1, 2015 – September 30, 2016 and progressing until reaching the last 
quarter of 2018. 
 
 
The coefficients for the interaction between climate responsibility and Trump’s popularity 
indicate that there was a shift from the year 2017 to 2018. In 2017, when Donald Trump’s 
popularity rose, the effect of corporate climate responsibility on stock returns would become 
even higher, whereas, in 2018, that effect would decrease. 
These findings, when aligned to what was described on figure 5, help strengthen the argument 
that the climate policy shock brought higher awareness to the public regarding environmental 
issues, which in turn made the climate responsibility premium rise. To elucidate this, let us 
compare what happened in 2017 to 2018. 
In 2017, the premium was still on the rise, and an increase in Trump’s popularity sharpened, 
even more, the effect of climate responsibility on stock returns. In 2018, however, the premium 
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have achieved a peak and investors would stop pricing environmentally-friendly stocks even 
higher. Indeed, a rise in Trump’s popularity in that year was already creating negative effects 
on the premium. 
 
Table 6. Pricing of Climate’s Strategy and Donald Trump’s Popularity 
This table shows the panel regression results of firm’s daily CAPM adjusted returns on the environmental score 
(E_Score), the ineteraction between the environmental score and Trump’s daily approval score, plus the usual set 
of controls (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market capitalization, leverage, ROA and revenue growth). The 
approval scores were extracted from Ramussen Reports polls, and standardized to a zero average and one-unit 
standard deviation. Column 1 presents the results for the panel regressions the period between January 20, 2017 
and December 31, 2017; Column 2 presents the results for the period between January 1, 2018 and Dec 31, 2018; 
and Column 3 presents the results for those two periods combined. All models include FF 12 industry fixed effects. 
The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available information on the 
indicators each day. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 Period: 2017 2018 2017-2018 
  (1) (2) (3) 
E_Score 0.08* 0.18*** 0.02 
E-Score x Trump's Approval 0.06** -0.40*** -0.40** 
Observations 416304 422276 838580 
R-Squared 0.03 0.05 0.02 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
12 Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Day Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
S.e. clustered at firm-level Yes Yes Yes 
Dependent Variable CAPM Adjusted Returns 
 
Overall, this indicates that Donald Trump’s increased influence kept bringing two opposite 
shocks to the climate responsibility premium. One coming from the perceived deregulation of 
climate policy, favouring less responsible firms, and the other coming from the rise of 
environmental awareness, benefiting more responsible ones. The awareness shock prevailed 
over the first during the end of the year 2016 and the whole year of 2017. In 2018, however, 
the deregulation shock started overriding the other, in times the premium stopped increasing.  





This section is dedicated to performing robustness checks on the results both from the short and 
long-term stock price reactions to the events studied. On the short-term reactions, all the checks 
are performed by controlling for the alternative set of returns and a more detailed industry 
classification. The main model is also replicated using the original score from Refinitiv as the 
environmental variable (E_Score_R). Furthermore, a test for alternative event and estimation 
windows is made, as well as a control for regressions using winsorized data, and a final 
regression controlling for corporate governance and social responsibility. On the long-term 
reactions, a different model with an expanding estimation window is tested. 
Alternative Set of Returns and FF 30 Industry Classification 
On all the models deployed for the short-term stock price reactions, even for the remainder on 
this robustness section, a control for the alternative set of controls and for the Fama French 30 
industry classification is made. 
The alternative set of returns consists of the raw returns and the FF adjusted returns. Table A3 
presents the coefficients of the E_Score and carbon intensity for the main model, including all 
the (cumulative) abnormal returns. The results for the raw returns are very similar to the ones 
on the CAPM adjusted ones, but the FF adjusted returns present less statistically significant 
outcomes. This is the case because firms with higher environmental scores also had, on average, 
higher value factors, which reduced the impact of climate responsibility. However, the results 
on the FF adjusted returns still reflect that there was an instant positive reaction to carbon-
intensive firms on election day and good overall reactions for climate responsible firms on 
Donald Trump’s and Scott Pruitt’s event windows. 
Table A3 also shows the results controlling for the FF 30 industries fixed effects. Including 
more industries allows a removal of industry-specific effects, but could potentially bring a loss 
of variation within the subsamples. The results are very similar, controlling for these 30 
industries, and are all in line with findings on this thesis. 
Alternative Environmental Variable 
Table A4 shows the coefficients of Refinitiv’s original environmental pillar score (E_Score_R) 
for all regressions. As explained in the dataset and methodology section, this variable contains 
carbon intensity factors, which negatively impact the score. This could potentially decrease the 
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perceived premium for climate responsibility, as we know, carbon-intensive firms benefitted 
from the events studied.  
The results presented, despite still being in line with the findings of the thesis, are less 
significant. For Donald Trump’s event, for the 3 and 5 days event windows, one can still find 
statistically significant positive results. However, the coefficients for Scott Pruitt’s nomination 
are not statistically significant. This is an impressive turn, given the most significant results in 
the main model were from Scott Pruitt’s nomination. The inclusion of current environmental 
footprint factors in the variable, such as total emission of CO2 and the total weight of water 
polluted, did overshadow the positive effects for long-term commitments to climate 
responsibility in this case. 
Different Estimation and Event Windows 
On the original model, the CAPM and FF adjusted returns, for Scott Pruitt’s nomination and 
the Paris Agreement event, were computed by estimating their given factors on the same 
estimation window used for Donald Trump’s event. The main reason to do it was not to include 
the extraordinary effects from the election on the betas. However, when adjusting the estimation 
windows to one year, closing 20 days before the events, the results are identical to the original 
ones for these two events. Table A5 presents these results. 
As explained in the dataset and methodology section, it may be reasonable to include some days 
prior to the event on the event window, especially if the information could have been leaked to 
some investors prior to its announcement. Hence, an alternative set of event windows was used 
for Scott Pruitt’s nomination and the announcement to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. 
Table A6 shows the regression results using windows of 3, 5 and 9 days, with the actual event 
date being in the centre. The results are also analogous to the originals. 
Controlling for Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility 
Another concern with the empirical analysis is that the climate responsibility premium could 
have been driven by the higher corporate governance and corporate social responsibility levels 
that climate responsible firms also possess (Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog, 2016). For instance, 
if investors perceived that financial deregulation would happen, perhaps better-governed 
companies could have benefited relative to others. Socially responsible investing, other than 
green investing, could have gained as well from Trump’s election, as suggested by practitioners 
of impact investing (Dreizler (2019)). 
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In order to control for these effects, the corporate governance and social responsibility scores 
were extracted from Refinitiv’s ASSET4 database, and the regressions were re-run utilizing 
these variables. Table A7 shows that the coefficients for environmental responsibility remain 
statistically significant on both Donald Trump’s election and Scott Pruitt’s nomination, despite 
a decrease in their total value. These results are in line with the main findings. 
Results with Winsorized Data 
There is the chance that outliers could influence the results of this study, particularly on the 
coefficients regarding carbon intensity, which is a highly skewed variable (14.62). So, Table 
A8 presents the results of the main regressions, for the coefficients of carbon intensity and 
environmental score, but with all the data for all variables winsorized. The winsorization was 
made through the internal quartile range (IQR) method. The IQR is the difference between the 
third and first quartile, and this value is then multiplied by 1.5. Then, the boundaries are created 
as follow: 
𝑈𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 + 1.5 × 𝐼𝑄𝑅 
𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 = 𝑇ℎ𝑖𝑟𝑑 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒 − 1.5 × 𝐼𝑄𝑅 
The values outside these bounds are then winsorized. The results are generally similar, but now, 
on the day of Pruitt’s nomination, the coefficient for carbon intensity is statistically significant. 
Long-Term Returns with Expanding Event Window 
On their paper, S Ramelli, AF Wagner, RJ Zeckhauser and A Ziegler (2018) perform a long-
term analysis that, instead of regressing daily abnormal returns and then plotting their 
cumulative sums (as in figure 5), regresses the abnormal returns over time with an expanding 
estimation window. This method is limited in the sense that the values of all the independent 
variables can’t be updated through time, and over the long run, the results stop reflecting reality. 
Nonetheless, that same method is done and plotted in figure A1, until the end of the year 2017. 
The results are very similar in shape for that year. 
  





On November 8, 2016, the world was stunned by the unexpected election of Donald J. Trump 
as the President of the United States of America, raising expectations of a slacker environmental 
regulation. Scott Pruitt’s nomination to head the EPA only helped sharpen these expectations. 
The first major material turn in climate policy eventually took place on June 1, 2017, when 
Donald Trump announced the US’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. 
Investors in the stock market immediately reacted to the first shock, rewarding carbon-intensive 
industries, such as coal, petroleum, natural gas and steel-works. These results are in line with 
the general naïve predictions indicating that companies with higher environmental footprint 
should benefit from higher regulatory costs reductions, and thus achieve greater firm value.  
The naïve view would also suggest that environmentally responsible companies would 
underperform relative to others, given these unnecessarily wasted more resources than needed 
to comply with the regulations. Such firms, however, were rewarded during Donald Trump’s 
election and Scott Pruitt’s nomination, as seen in a within-industries analysis. These results can 
be explained by the rise of the general awareness in climate-related issues, which was sparked 
during these events. 
No significant reaction took place on the day of the announcement of the Paris Agreement 
withdrawal, suggesting that this event was not surprising enough. Trump’s election and Pruitt’s 
nomination should have provided sufficient signals to investors that, sooner or later, the US 
was going to leave the agreement. 
Looking into the long-term performance of environmentally responsible firms, it is possible to 
see that the climate responsibility premium increased until the end of the year 2017.  During 
this year, an increase of Donald Trump’s popularity was met, on average, with a rise in the 
premium. In 2018, however, investors stopped further rewarding environmentally responsible 
firms, suggesting that the general awareness had reached a peak. On this year, rises in the 
President’s popularity negatively impacted the climate responsibility premium. 
The long-term results thus suggest that Donald Trump’s increased influence consistently 
brought two different shocks to the market. One from the perceived deregulation of climate 
policy, and the other coming from the rise in general climate awareness. The awareness shock 
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prevailed until the end of 2017, benefitting firms with higher environmental scores. The 
deregulation shock started overriding in 2018, when the premium had reached a peak. 
Future streams of research may include a more thorough analysis of the reaction of shareholders 
to these events. Institutional investors’ actions towards E&S investment differ both from the 
regions they are from and the type of institution they are – for example, pension funds are more 
concerned with environmental concerns than hedge funds, which are natural arbitrageurs. Did 
investors from more environmentally responsible regions react less strongly to these events, 
given their awareness levels were already high? Have relatively less climate concerned 
institutions become more environmentally responsible in their investments? Learning how 
different investors reacted to these shocks should enable a further understanding of who are the 
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Table A1. ASSET4 ESG Data Glossary 
This table presents the description of the variables used in the computation of the original environmental score 
from Refinitiv’s ASSET4 database. The Polarity column indicates whether these variables are representative of 
Carbon Intensity or Climate Responsibility. Solely the Climate Responsibility variables were used for the 
computation of the E_Score (calculated by the author of the thesis). 
 
Title Description Polarity Units 
Agrochemical Products Does the company produce or 
distribute agrochemicals like 
pesticides, fungicides or herbicides? 
Carbon Intensity Y/N 
Cement CO2 Equivalents 
Emission 
Total CO2 and CO2 equivalents 
emission in tonnes per tonne of cement 
produced. 
Carbon Intensity Number 
Cement Energy Use 
Total energy use in gigajoules per 
tonne of clinker produced. 




The estimated total CO2 and CO2 
equivalents emission in tonnes. 
Carbon Intensity Number 
Flaring of Natural Gas Total direct flaring or venting of 
natural gas emissions 
Carbon Intensity Number 
Fleet CO2 Emissions Total fleet's average CO2 and CO2 
equivalent emissions in g/km. 
Carbon Intensity Number 
Fleet Fuel Consumption Total fleet's average fuel consumption 
in l/100km. 
Carbon Intensity Number 
GMO Products Does the company produce or 
distribute genetically modified 
organisms (GMO)? 
Carbon Intensity Y/N 
Nuclear Production Percentage of total energy production 
from nuclear energy. 
Carbon Intensity Percent 
Ozone-Depleting 
Substances 
Total amount of ozone depleting 
(CFC-11 equivalents) substances 
emitted 
Carbon Intensity Number 
Value - Emission 
Reduction/Discharge into 
Water System 
Total weight of water pollutant 
emissions in tonnes divided by net 
sales or revenue in US dollars. 
Carbon Intensity Number 
Value - Emission 
Reduction/Hazardous 
Waste 
Total amount of hazardous waste 
produced in tonnes divided by net 
sales or revenue in US dollars. 
Carbon Intensity Number 
Value - Emission 
Reduction/Waste 
Total amount of waste produced in 
tonnes divided by net sales or revenue 
in US dollars. 
Carbon Intensity Number 
Value - Resource 
Reduction/Energy Use 
Total direct and indirect energy 
consumption in gigajoules divided by 
net sales or revenue in US dollars. 
Carbon Intensity Number 
Value - Resource 
Reduction/Water Use 
Total water withdrawal in cubic meters 
divided by net sales or revenue in US 
dollars. 
Carbon Intensity Number 
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Title Description Polarity Units 
Biodiversity Impact 
Reduction 
Does the company report on its impact 





Clean Technology Is the company developing clean 
technology (wind, solar, hydro and 






Is the company aware that climate 








Has the company set targets or 








Does the company have a policy to 




Emissions Trading Does the company participate in any 
emissions trading initiative, as 






Does the company report on 
partnerships or initiatives with 
specialized NGOs, industry 
organizations, governmental or supra-
governmental organizations, which are 





Environmental Products Does the company report on at least 
one product line or service that is 
designed to have positive effect on the 
environment or which is 







Does the company report or provide 
information on sizable company-





ESG Screened Asset 
Under Management 
Does the company report on ESG 






Does the company report on initiatives 
to recycle, reduce, reuse, substitute, 









ISO 14000 or EMS 
Certified Percent 
The percentage of company sites or 
subsidiaries that are certified with any 




Labeled Wood Percentage The percentage of labeled wood or 





Noise Reduction Does the company develop new 
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Title Description Polarity Units 
NOx and SOx Emissions 
Reduction Initiatives 
Does the company report on initiatives 
to reduce, reuse, recycle, substitute, or 
phase out SOx (sulfur oxides) or NOx 






Does the company report or show 
initiatives to produce or promote 




Real Estate Sustainability 
Certification 
Does the company claim to lease, rent 
or market buildings that are certified 
by BREEAM, LEED or any other 












Staff Transport Impact 
Reduction Initiatives 
Does the company report on initiatives 
to reduce the environmental impact of 






Does the company develop products 
and services that improve the energy 




Value - Emission 
Reduction/Environmental 
Expenditures 
Does the company report on its 
environmental expenditures or does 
the company report to make proactive 
environmental investments to reduce 





Value - Emission 
Reduction/VOC 
Emissions Reduction 
Does the company report on initiatives 
to reduce, substitute, or phase out 
volatile organic compounds (VOC) or 
particulate matter less than ten microns 




Value - Emission 
Reduction/Waste 
Recycling Ratio 
Total recycled and reused waste 
produced in tonnes divided by total 




Value - Product 
Innovation/Environmental 
Project Financing 
Is the company a signatory of the 
Equator Principles (commitment to 
manage environmental issues in 
project financing)? OR Does the 
company claim to evaluate projects on 
the basis of environmental or 




Value - Product 
Innovation/Environmental 
R&D Expenditures 
Total amount of environmental R&D 
costs (without clean up and 
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Title Description Polarity Units 
Value - Product 
Innovation/Product 
Impact Minimization 
Does the company reports about take-
back procedures and recycling 
programs to reduce the potential risks 
of products entering the environment? 
OR Does the company report about 
product features and applications or 
services that will promote responsible, 
efficient, cost-effective and 




Value - Product 
Innovation/Renewable 
Energy Supply 
Total energy distributed or produced 
from renewable energy sources 





Water Technology Does the company develop products or 
technologies that are used for water 
treatment, purification or that improve 






Does the company have an 






Does the company conduct surveys of 








Does the company report or show to 
be ready to end a partnership with a 
sourcing partner, in the case of severe 
environmental negligence and failure 








Does the company use environmental 
or sustainable criteria in the selection 





Green Buildings Does the company report about 







Does the company report on initiatives 
to reduce the environmental impact on 
land owned, leased or managed for 






Does the company claim to use 








Has the company set targets or 








Has the company set targets or 








Does the company have a policy to 
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Does the company have a policy to 
include its supply chain in the 








Does the company have a policy to 








Does the company have a policy to 






Does the company report on initiatives 
to reduce, reuse, substitute or phase 




Value - Resource 
Reduction/Renewable 
Energy Use 
Total energy generated from primary 













Table A2. Carbon-Intensity and Stock Returns 
This table presents the OLS regression results running the CAPM adjusted returns on the Carbon Intensity variable and the set of control variables (cash ETR, 
foreign revenues, log market capitalization, leverage, ROA and revenue growth). The computations of these variables are described in the thesis. The sample 
includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available information on the indicators. All regressions include FF 12 industry fixed 
effects. Columns 1 to 3 include Donald Trump’s election day and subsequent 5 and 10-days cumulative returns, respectively. Columns 4 to 6 include Scott 
Pruitt’s nomination day and subsequent 5 and 10-days cumulative returns, respectively. Columns 7 to 9 include the Paris Agreement withdrawal announcement 
day and subsequent 5 and 10-days cumulative returns, respectively.  














  Trump's Election Pruitt's Nomination Paris Agreement Withdrawal 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dep. Variable: CAPM Adjusted Returns 
  Cumulative  Cumulative  Cumulative 
Event Window: Nov 9 5 days 10 days Dec 7 5 days 10 days Jun 1 5 days 10 days 
Carbon Intensity 0.65** 0.43 0.31 0.16 -0.10 0.10 -0.09 0.28 0.13 
Cash ETR 0.24 2.37** 2.63** -0.08 0.20 0.71 0.03 -0.76 0.44 
Foreign Revenues -0.01** -0.02** -0.02* 0.00 0.01** 0.00 -0.01*** 0.00 -0.03*** 
Log Market Cap -0.44*** -1.63*** -2.35*** 0.06 -0.14** -0.54*** -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.49*** 
Leverage -1.65*** -3.5*** -3.21*** 0.41* -0.91** -1.07* 0.00 -0.02 -0.49 
ROA -1.23 -5.21*** -1.04 2.43*** 3.77*** 5.56*** -0.78** 0.83 0.25 
Revenue Growth 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** -0.01*** -0.01** 0.00* 0.00 0.00 
Observations 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1835 1751 1751 1751 
R-Squared 13.10 23.84 26.59 15.72 6.92 9.72 4.85 6.88 15.84 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FF 12 Industries FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table A3. Main Regressions, including all set of returns and Industry FE 
This table presents the coefficients for the E_Score and Carbon Intensity variables on the OLS regressions ran against all the sets of abnormal returns. Columns 
(A), (C) and (E) include the coefficients for the Donald Trump’s election, Pruitt’s nomination and the Paris Agreement withdrawal events, respectively, and 
controlling for the FF 12 Industries fixed effects. Columns (B), (D) and (F) contain the same regressions, except these control for the FF 30 Industries fixed 
effects. All the regressions include the usual set of controls (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market capitalization, leverage, ROA and revenue growth). The 
sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available information on the indicators.  







  Trump's Election Pruitt's Nomination Paris Agreement Withdrawal 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Climate Variable: E_Score CI E_Score CI E_Score CI E_Score CI E_Score CI E_Score CI 
Abnormal Returns:             
Raw 1 Day 1.14 0.57** 1.03 0.40 2.36*** 0.18 2.06** 0.15 -0.17 -0.07 -0.29 -0.04 
Raw 3 Days 7.03*** 0.16 6.73** 0.14 3.70*** 0.04 3.72*** 0.16 -1.24 0.13 -1.06 0.10 
Raw 5 Days 6.53** 0.26 5.13* 0.04 4.46*** -0.04 3.97** 0.11 -1.93 0.36 -2.40* 0.22 
Raw 10 Days 7.71** 0.09 6.79** -0.17 4.60** 0.16 3.76* 0.44 3.19* 0.15 3.91** 0.20 
Raw Until Dec 16 18.53*** 0.42 15.94*** 0.33 6.56*** 0.10 5.66** 0.32 - - - - 
Raw Until Dec 17 12.40 2.51 11.87 4.32* 0.43 2.19 1.58 4.31** 3.52 1.62 2.43 2.21 
CAPM 1 Day 1.57 0.56** 1.53 0.41 2.74*** 0.17 2.49*** 0.17 -0.05 -0.10 -0.13 -0.06 
CAPM 3 Days 7.61*** 0.14 7.40*** 0.16 4.33*** 0.02 4.43*** 0.18 -1.10 0.09 -0.87 0.08 
CAPM 5 Days 7.43*** 0.23 6.15** 0.06 5.17*** -0.06 4.78*** 0.13 -1.81 0.32 -2.23 0.20 
CAPM 10 Days 9.01*** 0.06 8.28*** -0.13 5.34** 0.14 4.60** 0.46 3.36* 0.10 4.14** 0.17 
CAPM Until Dec 16 20.47*** 0.37 18.16*** 0.39 7.00*** 0.09 6.16** 0.33 - - - - 
CAPM Until Dec 17 20.30 2.30 20.89 4.56** 6.83 2.02 8.89 4.50** 5.09 1.19 4.52 1.93 
FF 1 Day 0.70 0.58** 0.99 0.52* 2.17*** 0.13 1.88** 0.13 0.23 -0.04 0.28 0.00 
FF 3 Days 5.10* 0.22 5.91** 0.49 3.09** -0.01 3.34** 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.43 0.14 
FF 5 Days 3.23* 0.26 3.16 0.43 4.26*** -0.13 3.78** 0.06 -1.12 0.35 -1.56 0.19 
FF 10 Days 4.58 0.11 5.25 0.30 4.13* 0.09 3.44 0.44 1.91 0.10 2.87 0.21 
FF Until Dec 16 9.96* 0.22 9.60* 0.89 5.82** 0.03 4.97** 0.30 - - - - 
FF Until Dec 17 22.98* 2.34 23.25* 4.41** 18.85 2.14 18.63 3.82* 5.64 1.13 4.73 1.88 
FF Industry Effects 12 Industries 30 Industries 12 Industries 30 Industries 12 Industries 30 Industries 





Table A4. Alternative Regressions: E_Score_R as the Independent Variable 
This table presents the coefficients for the E_Score_R variable on the OLS regressions ran against all the sets of 
abnormal returns. Columns (A), (C) and (E) include the coefficients for the Donald Trump’s election, Pruitt’s 
nomination and the Paris Agreement withdrawal events, respectively, and controlling for the FF 12 Industries fixed 
effects. Columns (B), (D) and (F) contain the same regressions, except these control for the FF 30 Industries fixed 
effects. All the regressions include the usual set of controls (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market capitalization, 
leverage, ROA and revenue growth). The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, 
that had available information on the indicators.  






 Trump's Election Pruitt's Nomination 
Paris Agreement 
Withdrawal 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Climate Variable E_Score_R 
Abnormal Returns:       
Raw 1 Day 0.18 0.08 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.10 
Raw 3 Days 1.13 1.05 0.15 0.24 0.05 0.17 
Raw 5 Days 1.92* 1.81* 0.28 0.29 -0.46 -0.31 
Raw 10 Days 2.47** 2.17* -0.37 -0.59 0.79 1.09 
Raw Until Dec 16 2.92* 2.72 -0.28 -0.41 - - 
Raw Until Dec 17 2.81 3.04 -0.38 -0.09 11.25*** 11.54*** 
CAPM 1 Day 0.20 0.08 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.17 
CAPM 3 Days 1.16 1.06 0.17 0.25 0.15 0.26 
CAPM 5 Days 1.96* 1.83* 0.31 0.30 -0.37 -0.23 
CAPM 10 Days 2.52** 2.19** -0.34 -0.58 0.90 1.20* 
CAPM Until Dec 16 3.00* 2.75* -0.26 -0.41 - - 
CAPM Until Dec 17 3.14 3.16 -0.12 0.00 12.32*** 12.53*** 
FF 1 Day 0.10 -0.02 0.14 0.17 0.27 0.25 
FF 3 Days 0.87 0.77 0.04 0.11 0.27 0.40 
FF 5 Days 1.49 1.34 0.21 0.20 -0.36 -0.18 
FF 10 Days 2.03* 1.68 -0.47 -0.72 1.00 1.29* 
FF Until Dec 16 1.87 1.53 -0.39 -0.54 - - 
FF Until Dec 17 3.35 3.50 1.10 1.43 12.08*** 12.18*** 
FF Industry Effects 12 Ind 30 Ind 12 Ind 30 Ind 12 Ind 30 Ind 
Climate Responsibility Premium:  An Event Study on the US Climate Policy Shock 
47 
 
Table A5. Alternative Regressions: Different Estimation Windows 
This table presents the coefficients for the E_Score variable on the OLS regressions ran against an alternative set 
of abnormal returns. These abnormal returns were computed using different estimation windows, with a length of 
1 year and ending 20 days prior to the event. Columns (A) and (C) include the coefficients for Pruitt’s nomination 
and the Paris Agreement withdrawal event, respectively, and controlling for the FF 12 Industries fixed effects. 
Columns (B), (D) contain the same regressions, except these control for the FF 30 Industries fixed effects. All the 
regressions include the usual set of controls (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market capitalization, leverage, ROA 
and revenue growth). The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available 
information on the indicators.  
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1 
 
 
Table A6. Alternative Regressions: Different Event Windows 
This table presents the coefficients for the E_Score variable on the OLS regressions ran against an alternative set 
of abnormal returns. These abnormal returns were computed using different event windows, including now days 
prior to the actual event. Columns (A) and (C) include the coefficients for Pruitt’s nomination and the Paris 
Agreement withdrawal event, respectively, and controlling for the FF 12 Industries fixed effects. Columns (B) and 
(D) contain the same regressions, except these control for the FF 30 Industries fixed effects. All the regressions 
include the usual set of controls (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market capitalization, leverage, ROA and 
revenue growth). The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available 
information on the indicators.  
∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1 
  Pruitt's Nomination Paris Agreement Withdrawal 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Climate Variable E_Score 
Abnormal Returns:     
Raw 3 days (-1 to +1) 3.04*** 2.64** -0.90 -0.55 
Raw 5 Days (-2 to +2) 2.36 1.85 0.84 1.37 
Raw 9 Days (-4 to +4) 9.04*** 8.34*** -2.70 -2.71 
CAPM 3 Days (-1 to +1) 3.57*** 3.23*** -0.69 -0.30 
CAPM 5 Days (-2 to +2) 3.25* 2.81* 1.08 1.65 
CAPM 9 Days (-4 to +4) 3.18* 2.74 -2.45 -2.41 
FF 3 days (-1 to +1) 2.86** 2.56** -0.12 0.29 
FF 5 days (-2 to +2) 1.87 1.82 2.41** 2.97** 
FF 9 days (-4 to +4) 6.44*** 6.18*** -0.71 -0.76 
FF Industry Effects 12 Ind 30 Ind 12 Ind 30 Ind 
  Pruitt's Nomination Paris Agreement Withdrawal 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) 
Climate Variable: E_Score 
Abnormal Returns:     
CAPM 1 Day 2.75*** 2.57*** -0.01 -0.10 
CAPM 3 Days 4.22*** 4.37*** -0.67 -0.59 
CAPM 5 Days 5.27*** 4.87*** -1.64 -2.22 
CAPM 10 Days 5.42*** 4.67** 2.83 3.32* 
FF 1 Day 2.34*** 2.16*** 0.17 0.13 
FF 3 Days 3.01** 3.32** 0.11 0.18 
FF 5 Days 4.67*** 4.26*** -0.85 -1.44 
FF 10 Days 4.38** 3.71* 1.61 2.30 
FF Industry Effects 12 Ind 30 Ind 12 Ind 30 Ind 




Table A7. Alternative Regressions: Using Winsorized Data 
This table presents the coefficients for the E_Score and Carbon Intensity variables on the OLS regressions ran against all the sets of abnormal returns. All the 
numerical (non-dummy) variables were winsorized according to the interquartile method described in the Robustness section. Columns (A), (C) and (E) include 
the coefficients for the Donald Trump’s election, Pruitt’s nomination and the Paris Agreement withdrawal events, respectively, and controlling for the FF 12 
Industries fixed effects. Columns (B), (D) and (F) contain the same regressions, except these control for the FF 30 Industries fixed effects. All the regressions 
include the usual set of controls (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market capitalization, leverage, ROA and revenue growth). The sample includes the Russell 
3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available information on the indicators. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.1 
             
  Trump's Election Pruitt's Nomination Paris Agreement Withdrawal 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Climate Variable: E_Score CI E_Score CI E_Score CI E_Score CI E_Score CI E_Score CI 
Abnormal Returns:             
Raw 1 Day 0.93 1.32*** 0.95 0.94* 2.27*** 0.50** 2.02** 0.38 -0.17 -0.08 -0.30 -0.02 
Raw 3 Days 6.91** 0.54 6.68** 0.43 3.68*** 0.13 3.69*** 0.34 -1.28 0.25 -1.09 0.25 
Raw 5 Days 6.28** 1.11 5.08* 0.29 4.44*** 0.00 3.92** 0.37 -2.04 0.7* -2.47* 0.53 
Raw 10 Days 7.54** 0.65 6.81** -0.34 4.50** 0.53 3.66* 1.10* 3.14 0.30 3.85** 0.49 
Raw Until Dec 16 18.07*** 1.96 15.87*** 0.85 6.45*** 0.48 5.57** 0.91 - - - - 
Raw Until Dec 17 11.84 4.76 11.47 8.03** 0.22 3.28 1.17 8.09** 3.19 2.77 2.33 3.43 
CAPM 1 Day 1.39 1.26*** 1.45 0.97** 2.66*** 0.45* 2.45*** 0.41 -0.02 -0.19 -0.13 -0.08 
CAPM 3 Days 7.52*** 0.46 7.35*** 0.48 4.32*** 0.05 4.4*** 0.40 -1.10 0.12 -0.89 0.18 
CAPM 5 Days 7.2** 0.99 6.09** 0.37 5.18*** -0.09 4.73*** 0.43 -1.88 0.58 -2.29 0.46 
CAPM 10 Days 8.88*** 0.47 8.29*** -0.23 5.26** 0.43 4.5** 1.17* 3.35* 0.14 4.09** 0.41 
CAPM Until Dec 16 20.07*** 1.70 18.06*** 1.01 6.91*** 0.42 6.07** 0.95 - - - - 
CAPM Until Dec 17 19.99 3.71 20.42 8.68** 6.83 2.43 8.42 8.62** 5.17 1.29 4.54 2.63 
FF 1 Day 0.56 1.12** 0.90 1.20** 2.10** 0.39 1.84** 0.37 0.27 -0.13 0.27 0.04 
FF 3 Days 5.17* 0.04 5.81** 1.18 3.12** -0.11 3.3** 0.48 0.13 0.32 0.40 0.28 
FF 5 Days 3.22 0.35 3.05 1.17 4.27*** -0.18 3.73** 0.34 -1.24 0.71* -1.61 0.45 
FF 10 Days 4.69 -0.22 5.19 0.70 4.07* 0.29 3.33 1.17* 2.00 -0.10 2.83 0.43 
FF Until Dec 16 9.96* 0.24 9.39* 2.26 5.74** 0.29 4.87** 0.92 - - - - 
FF Until Dec 17 22.57* 4.09 22.82* 8.33** 18.35 4.13 18.30 6.99* 5.67 1.32 4.73 2.63 
FF Industry Effects 12 Industries 30 Industries 12 Industries 30 Industries 12 Industries 30 Industries 




Table A8. Controlling for Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility 
This table presents the coefficients for the E_Score variable on the OLS regressions ran against all the sets of 
abnormal returns. All the regressions include the usual set of controls (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market 
capitalization, leverage, ROA and revenue growth) plus controls for Refinitiv’s ASSET4 scores on Corporate 
Governance and Social Responsibility. Columns (A), (C) and (E) include the coefficients for the Donald Trump’s 
election, Pruitt’s nomination and the Paris Agreement withdrawal events, respectively, and controlling for the FF 
12 Industries fixed effects. Columns (B), (D) and (F) contain the same regressions, except these control for the FF 
30 Industries fixed effects. The sample includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had 
available information on the indicators.  









  Trump's Election Pruitt's Nomination 
Paris Agreement 
Withdrawal 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) 
Climate Variable: E_Score 
Abnormal Returns:       
Raw 1 Day -0.88 -1.15 2.21*** 1.94* -0.68 -0.85 
Raw 3 Days 2.82** 2.67 3.05*** 3.24** -1.66 -1.48 
Raw 5 Days 2.29* 0.40 3.42*** 2.82 -1.37 -1.94 
Raw 10 Days 2.97** 2.47 3.7** 2.75 0.77 1.21 
Raw Until Dec 16 12.14*** 8.61 7.46*** 5.95** - - 
Raw Until Dec 17 4.41 2.92 -0.27 0.26 1.66 0.31 
CAPM 1 Day -0.17 -0.37 2.82*** 2.60** -0.49 -0.57 
CAPM 3 Days 3.78** 3.71 4.07*** 4.34*** -1.43 -1.15 
CAPM 5 Days 3.74** 1.97 4.58*** 4.08** -1.17 -1.65 
CAPM 10 Days 5.09*** 4.76 4.90*** 4.05 1.04 1.59 
CAPM Until Dec 16 15.29*** 12.02** 8.18*** 6.72** - - 
CAPM Until Dec 17 17.24 16.81 10.13 11.51 4.17 3.90 
FF 1 Day -1.08 -0.82 2.23*** 2.02** -0.23 -0.19 
FF 3 Days 1.15 2.49 2.77** 3.33** -0.21 -0.05 
FF 5 Days -0.64 -0.62 3.63*** 3.11 -0.57 -1.21 
FF 10 Days 0.47 2.15 3.63** 2.96 -0.31 0.62 
FF Until Dec 16 4.31* 4.32 6.95** 5.60* - - 
FF Until Dec 17 20.07* 18.87 22.70 20.15 4.84 4.36 
FF Industry Effects 12 Ind 30 Ind 12 Ind 30 Ind 12 Ind 30 Ind 






































Figure A1. Plotting Long-Term Analysis with Expanding Event Window 
This figure plots the coefficients on the environmental responsibility score (E_Score) from the day of Donald 
Trump’s election until the end of December 2018. Each observation represents an OLS regression running the 
CAPM adjusted returns (on an event window starting on November 9, 2016, until the day of the actual observation) 
against the environmental score, plus the usual set of control variables (cash ETR, foreign revenues, log market 
capitalization, leverage, ROA and revenue growth). All models include FF 12 industry fixed effects. The sample 
includes the Russell 3000 constituents on November 8, 2016, that had available information on the indicators each 
day. 
 
 
 
